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Mark D. Rosen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, commentators from across the political 
spectrum have documented courts’ unpredictable and inconsistent applica-
tion of preemption doctrine.1  Some scholars have focused on the analytics 
of preemption2—what long has been viewed as a straightforward doctrine 
that did not require much in the way of theorizing—thereby generating 
some surprisingly helpful insights.3  The renewed scholarly attention also 
has resulted in proposals that range from recommendations that courts 
tweak certain doctrinal presumptions,4 completely abandon preemption doc-
trine,5 or, only somewhat more modestly, wholly restructure preemption 
doctrine.6  Robert Schapiro’s and Thomas Merrill’s Symposium proposals, 
to which this Article largely is directed, fall into the last category.7 
It is useful to complement the intensive scrutiny to which preemption 
has been subject with a broader, more contextual analysis that considers 
preemption alongside other doctrines that seek to accomplish structurally 
similar ends.  Such contextual analysis, it turns out, provides useful per-
spectives vis-à-vis both present preemption doctrine and recent scholarly 
proposals.   
Part I shows that preemption doctrine functions almost identically to 
the contract doctrine of unenforceability on grounds of public policy, but 
 
*  Professor and Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.  
1  For a good collection of sources, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 233 & 
nn.26–30 (2000). 
2  See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008). 
3  See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 770–73.  
4  See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Reme-
dies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997) (arguing that the courts should not presume preemption and rather 
should require an unmistakably clear intent to preempt before dismissing state tort claims). 
5  See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 770 (advocating that the categories of “conflict” and “field” pre-
emption be abandoned and replaced by ordinary statutory interpretation such that “there should be no 
such thing as preemption doctrine”). 
6  See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 1, at 260 (arguing that the sole test under preemption should be 
whether state law “contradicts a rule validly established by federal law”). 
7  See Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811 (2008); Merrill, supra 
note 2. 
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that each of the two doctrines approaches its respective task in a fundamen-
tally different way: preemption doctrine deploys a “unilateralist” approach 
that looks only to federal interests, whereas the public policy exception re-
lies on a “multilateralist” approach that takes account of all stakeholder in-
stitutions.  Identifying a radically different doctrinal approach to solving a 
similar problem suggests that contemporary preemption doctrine’s approach 
is neither axiomatic nor self-evident.  With the understanding that there is a 
plausible alternative to preemption doctrine’s current approach, Part I then 
considers why courts have adopted unilateralism in the preemption context, 
concluding that there is no immediately obvious answer.  Indeed, Part I’s 
analysis reveals that justifying today’s unilateralist preemption doctrine is 
even more complicated because a side-by-side analysis of preemption doc-
trine and the public policy exception suggests that there in fact is a third 
plausible approach that courts could take: judicial passivity, under which 
Congress (perhaps in conjunction with agencies) alone makes preemption 
decisions.   
Part II confronts the question of how to choose between the three doc-
trinal approaches.  Part II suggests that recent scholarly proposals, including 
Schapiro’s and Merrill’s, can be understood as identifying three factors that 
are relevant to choosing the best approach: (1) the substantive considera-
tions that inform the decision whether state law should be displaced, (2) the 
institutional competence of various governmental entities to undertake the 
appropriate analysis, and (3) the legitimacy of each of these governmental 
entities deciding whether state law is to be preempted.  Schapiro’s and 
Merrill’s articles make important contributions to answering these ques-
tions.  Part II summarizes and, where appropriate, critiques their contribu-
tions.   
In the process, Part II shows that this analysis is aided once again by 
examining contexts outside of preemption that confront similar issues.  Pre-
emption sorts out conflicts that can arise when more than one societal insti-
tution—state governments and Congress—appear to possess regulatory 
authority over a given matter.  As Part II shows, multiple governmental in-
stitutions have overlapping powers in other contexts, including in horizontal 
federalism (i.e., interstate relations) and in the separation of powers.  Part II 
shows that these other contexts of “concurrent” governmental powers can 
illuminate the costs and benefits of various approaches to sorting out con-
flicts among the governmental institutions with overlapping authority. 
Several important conclusions emerge.  Both Schapiro and Merrill 
suggest that Congress and the Executive should and do play important roles 
in determining when and what state law is to be displaced, but that courts 
invariably will continue to be active participants in questions of preemption.  
Interestingly, both scholars also agree that courts should utilize a multilater-
alist doctrine of the sort found in the public policy context.  This Article ap-
plauds these conclusions, and furthermore suggests that the Judiciary’s 
adoption of the modifications that Schapiro and Merrill advocate likely will 
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allow Congress to assume the primary role in making preemption decisions 
in the future—which, the Article explains, is a highly desirable outcome.  
As to the interim period during which courts will continue to play an impor-
tant role in preemption issues, this Article suggests that two modest statu-
tory innovations can increase judicial functionality by ensuring that courts 
receive the necessary inputs of a multilateralist doctrine: states should be 
notified when lawsuits raise preemption issues and should have an uncondi-
tional right of intervention.  Finally, building on an important insight pro-
vided by Roderick Hills,8 this Article suggests that consideration should be 
given as to whether Congress should create some institutional alternative to 
courts and agencies that can more directly involve states when rendering 
preemption decisions. 
I. LESSONS FROM THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION: UNILATERALISM, 
MULTILATERALISM, AND JUDICIAL PASSIVITY 
Preemption doctrine plays an almost structurally identical role to that 
of contract law’s doctrine of unenforceability on grounds of public policy—
the “public policy exception.”  Yet each doctrine uses a different methodol-
ogy to discharge its respective task.  The public policy exception’s different 
approach to resolving a similar problem simultaneously highlights that the 
basic approach that contemporary preemption doctrine has adopted is not 
inevitable and points to two plausible alternatives. 
It first is necessary to grasp the structural similarities shared by pre-
emption doctrine and the public policy exception.  The conclusion that fed-
eral law preempts state law means that the state law’s ordering of social 
relations must give way to that of the federal law, generally because Con-
gress, agencies, or courts view the state law as undermining the federal 
law’s efficacy.9  There are also modalities of ordering social relations apart 
from state law that potentially can interfere with the efficacy of a given law.  
One example is private contract.10  The public policy exception polices pri-
vate contracts’ interference with law and provides that contracts that un-
 
8  Roderick M. Hills, Jr., William T. Comfort, III Professor of Law, New York University School of 
Law, Comments at the Northwestern University Law Review Symposium: Ordering State-Federal Rela-
tions Through Federal Preemption Doctrine (Apr. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Hills, Comments]; see also email 
from Roderick Hills, Jr. to Mark D. Rosen, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Oct. 16, 
2007, 9:32 AM CST) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
9  Courts typically must engage in similar purpose analysis even when applying statutes containing 
express preemption provisions because express preemption provisions typically utilize open-ended lan-
guage.  See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005) (holding that the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’s express preemption provision did not preempt state tort 
failure to warn claims because, inter alia, such suits “would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the function-
ing of [the Act]”). 
10  See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in 
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007) (showing that private contracts can regulate individ-
ual behavior in much the same way that public statutes do). 
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dermine “public policy” are unenforceable.11  The public policy exception 
hence secures the primacy of public policy in the same way that preemption 
doctrine secures the primacy of federal law. 
Consider, for example, the many state statutes that aim to encourage 
marriage.  A question that regularly arises is whether unmarried cohabitants 
can allocate property through private contract in ways that mirror the allo-
cations provided by the state’s marriage statutes.  Enforcing such private 
contracts could reduce citizens’ incentive to marry, thereby undermining 
those state laws that aim to strengthen the institution of marriage.  Relying 
on this line of reasoning, some (though not all) state courts have concluded 
that cohabitation agreements are unenforceable on grounds of public pol-
icy.12 
Interestingly, the public policy exception is not limited to contracts that 
interfere with state statutes.  For example, one federal court considered the 
enforceability of a covenant not to sue for trademark infringement in cir-
cumstances where there was genuine concern as to public confusion.13  The 
court recognized that enforcing the covenant, and thereby precluding the 
lawsuit by the party claiming trademark infringement, would interfere with 
federal trademark law’s paramount policy of avoiding public confusion 
concerning marks.14  (Stay tuned for a few paragraphs to see how the federal 
court decided the question!) 
In short, both preemption doctrine and the public policy exception are 
mechanisms for displacing modalities of social ordering that interfere with 
a favored governmental regulation.  But though they are structurally paral-
lel, each beckons courts to take account of different considerations.  Pre-
emption doctrine asks courts to focus almost exclusively on the federal law 
and federal interests.  The doctrines of express and implied preemption, and 
the latter’s subdoctrines of conflict preemption, field preemption, and frus-
tration of purpose or obstacle preemption,15 ask courts to consider only the 
federal statute.  Preemption doctrine’s exclusive focus on the federal law is 
moderated only slightly by the presumption against preemption in fields of 
law “which the States have traditionally occupied”16 because, among other 
 
11  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
12  See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (refusing to enforce a cohabitation agree-
ment for public policy reasons).  See generally Symposium, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of 
Marvin v. Marvin, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1261 (2001).  But see Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 
(Wis. 1987) (holding that cohabitation contracts are not rendered unenforceable by a pro-marriage fam-
ily code). 
13  See T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 449 F. Supp. 813, 827 (D.R.I. 1978). 
14  See id. 
15  For a fuller elaboration of the details of these various preemption doctrines, see Merrill, supra 
note 2, at 738–41, and Nelson, supra note 1, at 226–29. 
16  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
102:781  (2008) Contextualizing Preemption 
 785 
reasons, it is only inconsistently invoked and applied.17  The public policy 
exception, by contrast, explicitly bids courts to consider not only the law 
that is potentially imperiled by the private contract at issue, but the counter-
vailing interests in enforcing the contract (such as the parties’ justified ex-
pectations and the possibility of forfeiture in the event enforcement were 
denied).18 
This chasm between these two doctrines is vast.  In the helpful termi-
nology found in the conflict-of-laws literature, preemption is a “unilateral-
ist” doctrine that takes account of only one of the institutions whose 
interests are at stake: the federal government.  The public policy exception, 
by contrast, is a “multilateralist” doctrine that asks the decisionmaker to 
take account of the concerns of all relevant institutions whose interests are 
implicated.19  Accordingly, the mere fact that a private contract is in tension 
with the policy underlying a particular statute does not necessarily mean 
that the contract cannot stand.  So, for instance, in the trademark case men-
tioned above, the federal district court enforced the covenant not to sue, de-
spite having found that there existed a real danger of public confusion, on 
account of the policy of freedom of contract.20 
Why is preemption doctrine unilateralist whereas the public policy ex-
ception is multilateralist?  It might be thought that preemption doctrine’s 
unilateralism can be justified on the ground that preemption is based on the 
Supremacy Clause, under which federal law trumps state law.21  Because 
federal law has trumping power, then conceivably only federal law need be 
consulted to determine whether state law has been displaced. 
But this explanation is unpersuasive.  To begin, the public policy ex-
ception likewise operates over domains of private contracting where the 
government unquestionably has the power to regulate and thereby oust the 
private ordering that otherwise would be permissible.  In other words, gov-
ernmental regulation also is “supreme” in relation to the private ordering 
that is at issue in the public policy exception cases.  For example, the state 
courts that have held that their family statutes do not render cohabitation 
agreements illegal concede that the state legislatures could have done so.22  
Yet, as we have seen, the public policy exception does not adopt unilateral-
 
17  See Merrill, supra note 2, at 741 (“[T]he presumption against preemption is honored as much in 
the breach as in observance.”). 
18  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
19  For a helpful discussion of the difference between unilateralist and multilateralist doctrines, see 
William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilater-
alism, 39 HARV. J. INT’L L. 101, 107–10 (1998). 
20  See T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 449 F. Supp. 813, 827 (D.R.I. 1978). 
21  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
22  See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Wis. 1987) (“We find no indication, however, 
that the Wisconsin legislature intended the Family Code to restrict in any way a court’s resolution of 
property or contract disputes between unmarried cohabitants.”). 
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ism.  The public policy exception accordingly shows that supremacy does 
not invariably lead to unilateralism.  
Further, there is a sensible explanation as to why supremacy does not 
invariably lead to unilateralism in the contexts of preemption doctrine and 
the public policy exception.  Both doctrines seek to determine whether a 
particular modality of social ordering has been displaced in circumstances 
where the institution with acknowledged trumping power has not unambi-
guously indicated that it sought to trump.  Accordingly, the central question 
that preemption doctrine and the public policy exception both face is how to 
determine whether trumping occurs when the institution with acknowledged 
trumping power has not been explicit.  In such circumstances, a unilateralist 
focus on the institution-with-trumping-power’s incomplete pronouncement 
surely is not the only plausible method for determining whether the compet-
ing modality of social ordering is to be displaced.  To the contrary, focusing 
exclusively on the ambiguous (or perhaps even nonexistent) pronouncement 
seems to be an eminently wrongheaded approach, an insightful point that 
has been made before by others.23   
Explaining the choice behind a unilateralist or multilateralist approach 
is complicated by yet another factor.  There are, in fact, three rather than 
two plausible approaches that courts can take to resolving the issues pre-
sented by preemption and the public policy exception.  In addition to the 
options of unilateralism and multilateralism, the third logical possibility is 
that no displacement occurs unless and until the institution with acknowl-
edged trumping power explicitly indicates both that there is to be trumping 
and what is to be trumped.  Indeed, this third option has not gone unrecog-
nized by scholars.  It is the approach embraced by Martin Redish24 and, to a 
slightly lesser degree, by Caleb Nelson.25  
In sum, the public policy exception shows that there are plausible al-
ternatives to preemption doctrine’s unilateralism.  There are, to be sure, 
many important differences between the public policy exception and pre-
emption doctrine, but none of them accounts for the radically different ap-
proaches of each doctrine.  For example, though it might be posited that the 
public policy exception appropriately is multilateralist because citizens’ 
freedom to contract is such an important societal value, the federalism in-
terests implicated in preemption also are important components of our po-
litical culture.  Because there are no ready explanations for the two 
 
23  Merrill, supra note 2, at 741–42; Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 132 (2004). 
24  Martin Redish advanced this view in oral comments during the Symposium.  Martin H. Redish, 
Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, 
Comments at the Northwestern University Law Review Symposium: Ordering State-Federal Relations 
Through Federal Preemption Doctrine (Apr. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Redish, Comments]; see also email 
from Martin H. Redish to Mark D. Rosen, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (July 20, 
2007, 11:46:00 CST) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
25  For a discussion of Nelson’s approach, see infra notes 36, 102. 
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doctrines’ markedly different approaches, the question naturally arises how 
best to choose among the three options.  And that is the subject of the next 
Part. 
II. CHOOSING AMONG THE THREE APPROACHES 
What considerations appropriately inform the choice among these 
competing approaches?  The recent preemption literature, including this 
Symposium’s contributions, have identified three principal factors that are 
relevant to choosing among these options: (1) the substantive considera-
tions that appropriately inform the decision whether state law should be 
displaced, and two institutional considerations, namely (2) the institutional 
competence of various governmental entities to undertake the appropriate 
analysis and (3) what governmental entities have constitutional or political 
legitimacy to render preemption decisions.  This Part canvasses and cri-
tiques Professor Schapiro’s and Professor Merrill’s answers to these impor-
tant questions.  This Part shows that preemption doctrine is best suited to a 
multilateralist analysis by—in the short run, at least—courts.  Further, can-
did judicial analysis of the relevant multilateralist considerations likely will 
enable Congress to take a more proactive role in preemption decisions in 
the future.  Finally, this Part suggests that the multilateralist analysis for 
preemption questions can be helpfully informed by looking to other doc-
trines that mediate conflicts where multiple governmental institutions have 
overlapping authority. 
A. Substantive Considerations 
This first Subpart reviews Robert Schapiro’s suggestions as to what 
factors appropriately inform preemption, and the second Subpart examines 
the factors Thomas Merrill identifies.  In contrast to contemporary preemp-
tion doctrine’s unilateralist character, both Schapiro and Merrill call for 
multilateralist doctrines.  Once again, this Subpart shows that analysis is 
aided by looking to contexts outside of preemption that confront similar is-
sues. 
1. Schapiro: From “Polyphony” to Concurrency.—Robert 
Schapiro’s Symposium contribution primarily relates to the first factor 
(substantive considerations), though it also has some bearing on the second 
(institutional competence).26  Schapiro helpfully seeks to create a “norma-
tive theory of preemption” that identifies considerations relevant to deter-
mining whether state law should be preempted.27  Schapiro’s approach to 
preemption is intertwined with his larger project—“polyphonic” federal-
 
26  See Schapiro, supra note 7. 
27  Id. at 812.  As I discuss at greater length below, Schapiro’s theory is not primarily directed to the 
courts but instead is “directed in the first instance to nonjudicial actors,” by which he means Congress 
and administrative agencies.  Id.  
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ism.28  Though I fully agree with Schapiro’s diagnosis of the imperfections 
of the usual spatial metaphors that are relied upon for conceptualizing fed-
eral-state relations,29 I have some reservations about the aural metaphor of 
“polyphony” that Schapiro aims to put in their place.  I instead will refer to 
the main point behind Schapiro’s proposed metaphor as the important rec-
ognition that federal and state power are largely concurrent.  My primary 
reluctance to embrace the metaphor of polyphony is the concern that po-
lyphony, which Schapiro appears to tie to federalism, may obscure the fact 
that the jurisdictional redundancy Schapiro identifies and celebrates is part 
of a larger phenomenon that is found in many contexts outside of federal-
ism.  In other words, it often is the case that one governmental entity’s 
power to do X is also possessed by at least one other governmental entity.30  
To provide just a few examples, first consider what conventionally is 
 
28  See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005) 
[hereinafter Schapiro, Interactive Federalism]; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Con-
stitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999) [hereinafter Schapiro, Polyphonic Feder-
alism]. 
29  See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 28.  Schapiro believes that the spatial metaphors 
ordinarily used to capture the relation between the federal and state governments are problematic for 
several reasons.  First, spatial metaphors naturally give rise to the conception that federal and state 
power cannot readily “occupy[] the same space without displacing each other or combining into a single 
new, unified whole.”  Id. at 253.  Spatial metaphors, in other words, readily lead to the sense that regula-
tory power over a given matter is possessed by either the federal or the state government (or instead by 
some newfangled hybrid of the two).  Second, Schapiro resists spatial metaphors because he believes 
that they are handmaidens to defining state power on the basis of territorial borders, which in his view is 
problematic because “[t]he borders between states and between nation-states have lost much of their 
significance.”  Schapiro, supra note 7, at 813.  Third, Schapiro thinks that spatial metaphors give rise to 
a fixed mental image that misleadingly suggests that the relation between the federal and state govern-
ments is static.  Id. at 838–39.  Schapiro’s aural metaphor is intended to avoid these three pitfalls.  First, 
aurality is intended to facilitate the understanding that federal and state powers can simultaneously coex-
ist because two or more musical notes can coexist in time and sometimes even retain their distinctive 
“voices.”  Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 28, at 253–54.  Second, the aural metaphor’s 
rejection of space “seeks to move beyond this focus on territoriality.”  Schapiro, supra note 7, at 813.  
Third, Schapiro suggests that his musical metaphor facilitates intuition of the dynamic relationship be-
tween state and federal governments like musical performances unfold over time.  Id. at 821. 
I fully sympathize with the impetus behind Schapiro’s effort to pen a new metaphor; lawyers and 
politicians frequently share the nonaxiomatic intuition that governmental power to do X rests with one, 
and only one, governmental institution, and spatial metaphors probably encourage this type of thinking 
insofar as physics teaches us that no two physical objects can occupy the same space.  I also strongly 
agree that territorial borders are imperfect proxies for defining the limits of regulatory powers.  See 
Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Considerations of 
States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 713 (2007) [hereinafter Rosen, Hard or Soft Plural-
ism]; Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 855 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen, Extraterritoriality].  I concur as well with Schapiro’s sub-
stantive point concerning the evolutionary nature of the federal-state relationship, though I am less cer-
tain that his musical metaphor significantly facilitates recognition of this point. 
30  See Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrency (Jan. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author) (providing a comprehensive analysis of this structural characteristic of American con-
stitutionalism). 
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dubbed the separation of powers.  Although Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that the President “shall have Power to grant Re-
prieves and Pardons,”31 the Supreme Court long has held that Congress has 
the power to grant amnesties that, the Court has acknowledged, are func-
tionally equivalent to pardons.32  Similarly, while the Constitution specifies 
that the Senate and President are the governmental institutions responsible 
for creating treaties,33 many of this country’s contemporary international ob-
ligations have been created outside of the treaty-making process by “sole 
executive agreements” (that are created solely by the President) and “con-
gressional-executive agreements” (that are created like ordinary domestic 
legislation, by both houses of Congress and the President) that in most re-
spects are the functional equivalents of treaties.34  To provide yet another 
example from the context of horizontal federalism,35 more than one state 
frequently has the power to apply its substantive law to a given person, 
transaction, or occurrence.36 
The recognition that concurrently held governmental powers—
“concurrency”—is not limited to the federalism context dovetails nicely 
with the fundamental insight that animates Schapiro’s Symposium contribu-
tion.  Schapiro seeks to situate preemption within the larger context of fed-
eralism insofar as he suggests that preemption analysis should self-
consciously be undertaken in view of federalism’s generic benefits of (as he 
calls it) “plurality, dialogue, and redundancy.”37  Like Schapiro’s effort to 
 
31  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
32  See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (recognizing the power of Congress to grant am-
nesty and noting that the difference between pardons and amnesties is “one rather of philological interest 
than of legal importance” (quoting Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152 (1877)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
33  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
34  See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 801–
03 (1995) (discussing the modern use of congressional-executive agreements); Bradford R. Clark, Do-
mesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007) (describing, and criticizing, the 
widespread modern use of sole executive agreements).  
35  For a discussion of horizontal federalism, see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Inter-
state Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1471–72 (2007).  
36  See Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 29, at 946–55.  There are many such examples.  To 
provide yet one more, the jury is not the sole institution with the power to engage in adjudicatory fact-
finding: judges in Article I courts find facts in the very same contests where juries would have the con-
stitutional power to find facts, see Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 559, 575–76 (2007), and Article III judges arguably engage in factfinding of the sort performed by 
juries when they decide motions for summary judgment and motions to grant judgments notwithstanding 
the verdict.  See Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View that Jackson’s Concurrence 
Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1718–
19 (2007) [hereinafter Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown]. 
37  Schapiro, supra note 7, at 819.  I agree with, and cannot improve upon, the elaboration of these 
benefits that he provides.  See id. at 819–22.  Schapiro appears to argue that these benefits of having 
multiple “nodes of governmental power” rather than only one counsels strongly, though not categori-
cally, against concluding that federal law preempts state law.  See id. at 818, 836–37.  I agree that pre-
emption analysis should take account of these considerations, but I do not think that they necessarily 
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contextualize preemption within a theory of federalism, contextualizing 
preemption in the broader frame of concurrency may prove to be illuminat-
ing for many reasons.   
To begin, canvassing concurrency in the many contexts outside of fed-
eralism where governmental institutions have overlapping powers deepens 
our understanding of concurrency’s benefits,38 and even helps identify addi-
tional generic benefits of concurrency in the federalism context that appro-
priately inform preemption analysis.  To provide just one example, a benefit 
of concurrency that is prominent in another context of concurrently held 
powers—that of local governmental law39—is that situating concurrent 
power in governmental entities that are responsive to smaller constituencies 
broadens citizens’ opportunities to actively participate in government by re-
ducing lobbying and other participation costs and reducing the number of 
people whose opinions must be won over before any particular policy pref-
erence can be enacted into law.  Preemption has the effect of eliminating 
both state and local governments as loci for political action, increasing the 
extent to which the large, impersonal federal government is the only avenue 
for political recourse. 
Additionally, concurrency’s omnipresence may provide additional rea-
sons for legislatures, agencies, and courts to pause before concluding that 
state law has been preempted.  Generally speaking, governmental power 
initially was presumed to fall exclusively to one institution, and only over 
time has been understood to be held concurrently by more than one institu-
tion.40  If one trusts the common law’s inductive method of reasoning and 
accordingly is inclined to give presumptive credit to patterns that have 
emerged across diverse doctrinal contexts over time, the general trajectory 
from exclusivity to concurrence provides additional reason to rethink pre-
empting state law, which has the effect of relegating a given arena of human 
activity to regulation by only a single governmental entity. 
Conversely, and just as importantly, analyzing preemption within the 
broader context of concurrency illuminates the costs of overlapping gov-
ernmental powers.  Schapiro provides a good starting point, noting that 
“[c]oncurrent regulation may undermine important principles of uniformity, 
finality, and hierarchical accountability.”41  A broader study of concurrency, 
                                                                                                                           
equate to so strong a presumption against preemption—one must also take account of the costs of po-
lyphony, and (as described further infra text accompanying note 42) Schapiro’s analysis curiously omits 
one of polyphony’s most important drawbacks. 
38  A work-in-progress of mine undertakes this very sort of analysis.  See Rosen, supra note 30, at 4. 
39  Local governmental law is yet another context of concurrent governmental powers insofar as state 
legislatures have the power to regulate the matters that fall within local governments’ regulatory author-
ity (though the converse is not true).  Concurrency occurs in this context because local governments en-
joy only those powers that have been delegated to them by state legislatures, and such delegations 
almost always are deemed to be nonexclusive. 
40  See Rosen, supra note 30, at 3. 
41  Schapiro, supra note 7, at 822. 
102:781  (2008) Contextualizing Preemption 
 791 
though, can help identify overlooked costs.  For example, a crucial cost of 
concurrency found in other contexts that Schapiro’s Symposium contribu-
tion surprisingly neglects is that governmental entities with overlapping au-
thority may issue edicts that outright conflict with one another or, less 
dramatically but also troublesome, that one entity’s requirements may inter-
fere with the efficacy of another governmental entity’s regulations.42 
Further, a broader study of concurrency may refine our understanding 
of the costs of concurrency, suggesting that either our concerns are over-
blown or, conversely, understated.  Consider, in this regard, Thomas 
Merrill’s insightful suggestion that preemption determinations appropriately 
involve analysis of whether “federal law . . . is in tension with state law . . .  
and whether this tension is sufficiently severe to warrant the displacement 
of state law.”43  Doctrines developed in other contexts of concurrently held 
powers likely will help refine this understanding in preemption doctrine.  
For example, assistance likely can come from the field of law known as 
“conflict of laws,” which addresses the phenomenon of states’ overlapping 
regulatory powers in the horizontal federalism context.  Doctrines such as 
“false conflict” and “moderate and restrained” interpretation illuminate that 
differences in what two governmental laws appear at first glance to require 
do not necessarily mean that the laws are in fact in tension with one an-
other. 
The concepts of “false conflict” and “moderate and restrained interpre-
tation” can be concretely illustrated by examining how such concepts would 
have been useful to the problem that the Supreme Court faced in American 
Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.44  “False conflicts” in the interstate conflict-
of-laws context refers to situations where careful examination of the poli-
cies underlying the two (or more) potentially applicable laws reveals that 
one (or more) of the laws simply is inapplicable to the situation at hand, 
thereby dissolving the apparent conflict insofar as only a single law actually 
applies.45  “Moderate and restrained” interpretation refers to an interpretive 
approach under which, where two states’ laws potentially conflict and the 
scope of State A’s law is uncertain, the court from State A construes its law 
narrowly (in a “moderate and restrained” fashion), thereby generating what 
conflict-of-laws scholars call a “false conflict”46 (and what others likely 
would a situation of “no” conflict). 
Garamendi concerned a California law that required any insurer doing 
business in the state to disclose information about all policies sold in 
 
42  Admittedly, one need not have recourse to a broader study of concurrency to identify this cost.  
Conflict figures prominently in the preemption case law, and has received the ample attention it deserves 
by other preemption scholars.  See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 743, 752. 
43  See id. at 743. 
44  539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
45  E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963). 
46  E.g., Bernkrant v. Fowlder, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594–95 (1961). 
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Europe between 1920 and 1945.47  The Supreme Court ruled that the state 
law was preempted by an executive agreement signed by President Clinton 
and German Chancellor Schroeder in which Germany agreed to enact legis-
lation establishing a funded foundation that would compensate persons who 
had suffered at the hands of German companies during the Nazi era.48  The 
executive agreement indicated that the foundation should be “the exclusive 
forum and remedy for the resolution of all asserted claims against German 
companies” arising from the Nazi era.49 
The concepts of false conflict and moderate and restrained interpreta-
tion suggest that the Court may have too quickly concluded that there was a 
“clear conflict” between the California law and the executive agreement.50  
The executive agreement’s pledge that the foundation would be the “exclu-
sive forum and remedy” need not be construed—indeed, is not most natu-
rally interpreted—as having application to the disclosure of information 
concerning potential claims, something that is antecedent to pursing a 
claim.  To the contrary, the state law could have been said to complement 
the foundation’s work insofar as it helped put deserving insurance victims 
on notice that they had potentially valid claims that could be pursued 
through the foundation. 
To be sure, whether a moderate and restrained approach to construing 
the scope of the executive agreement was sensible in Garamendi turns on a 
host of considerations not present in the context of domestic interstate con-
flicts.51  Awareness of the concepts of moderate and restrained interpreta-
tion and false conflict, however, make it apparent that the Garamendi Court 
was faced with several choices that the majority did not appear to appreciate 
and that in fact merited forthright consideration.  In short, although doc-
trines from one context cannot seamlessly be imported into another, insights 
likely can be taken from contexts in which sustained attention has been 
given to analogous concepts as those that arise in preemption questions. 
2. Merrill’s Proposed Substantive Considerations. 
a. Tension.—Although Thomas Merrill’s Symposium contribu-
tion primarily addresses institutional rather than substantive considerations, 
his comparative institutional analysis requires that he identify the substan-
 
47  539 U.S. at 401. 
48  Id. at 405–08. 
49  Id. at 406. 
50  See id. at 421. 
51  These include the appropriate preemptive scope of international “obligations” entered into by the 
President alone without the participation of the Senate in the form of treaty-making or Congress in the 
form of congressional-executive agreements, see Clark, supra note 34, and the appropriate scope of state 
regulatory authority with respect to matters that touch upon foreign relations in the absence of clear fed-
eral statute or treaty, see, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997).  A full examination of these issues, and their bearing on the issue in Gara-
mendi, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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tive criteria that properly inform the decision whether state law should be 
preempted.52  One of the principal insights of his article, already mentioned 
above, is: 
[Preemption], at bottom, requires a judgment about the degree of tension be-
tween federal and state law.  This is not simply a mechanical exercise in dis-
cerning ‘conflict,’ either in the sense of mutual exclusivity or frustration of 
purpose. . . . [It also] entails an inquiry into the pragmatic consequences of ei-
ther uniformity or diversity in legal standards in a given area.53 
Merrill’s analysis of the widely understood costs and benefits of uniform-
ity54 tracks in no small measure the considerations that Schapiro identifies 
under his rubric of “polyphony” (and that I locate under the rubric of “con-
currency”).  I agree that the literature on uniformity versus diversity can 
usefully inform preemption doctrine.  However, it seems preferable to situ-
ate the question that Merrill helpfully identifies—“what degree of tension 
between state and federal law is tolerable?”—into the larger context of 
whether concurrency or exclusivity is preferable, rather than to treat the is-
sue more narrowly as a choice between uniformity or diversity.  This is so 
for two reasons.  First, a full analysis of the choice between concurrency 
and exclusivity necessarily includes considerations regarding uniformity 
and diversity insofar as concurrency creates diversity.  Second, reducing the 
query to the tradeoffs between uniformity and diversity omits salient con-
siderations (such as the benefits of redundancy, which are ably described by 
Schapiro55). 
b. Constitutional considerations.—Merrill’s contribution also 
alludes to the “constitutional” consideration that any decision to preempt be 
“faithful to the Constitution’s division of powers between the federal gov-
ernment and the states.”56  For Merrill, the fact that preemption includes this 
 
52  See Merrill, supra note 2, at 746–53. 
53  Id. at 752. 
54  See id. (discussing the benefits and costs of uniformity in terms of efficiency in national commer-
cial markets). 
55  See Schapiro, supra note 7, at 819–22.  Schapiro notes that an advantage of regulatory overlap is 
that  
[s]tates and the federal government function in different settings and are subject to different pres-
sures and concerns. . . .  Each of these institutional actors gathers information in different ways, 
tends to focus on different kinds of costs and benefits, is subject to different constituent and inter-
est group influences, exercises its authority in different manners, and exists within different struc-
tures of accountability. 
Id. at 819–21.  Whereas Schapiro characterizes these as the “diversity” benefits of polyphony, see id., I 
think that they are better described as benefits that flow from jurisdictional redundancy.  Cf. Robert M. 
Cover, On the Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 639 (1981).  However characterized, this sort of consideration could be readily overlooked by 
reducing the preemption inquiry to a choice between diversity or uniformity. 
56  Merrill, supra note 2, at 747.  For essentially the same reasons that follow in the text above, I 
question the usefulness of another “constitutional” consideration to which Merrill points, that preemp-
tion should “promote[] a proper balance of authority between the central government and the states.”  Id.  
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substantive consideration has institutional implications that favor courts be-
cause “courts perform best on the constitutional variables” and have the po-
tential to perform better than either Congress or agencies on a comparative 
basis.57 
Merrill’s analysis here strikes me as off the mark.  With only a few ex-
ceptions, the Constitution does not “divide” powers between the federal 
government and the states, but rather grants the federal government powers 
that overlap with regulatory powers that the states also have.58  For exam-
ple, Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce does not mean that 
states are without power to regulate interstate commerce (though various 
doctrines admittedly place limits on their exercise of this power59).  Fur-
thermore, where the Constitution does explicitly deprive states of regulatory 
power—states may not coin money, lay imposts or duties, make treaties, or 
do any of the other things enumerated in Article I, Section 10—preemption 
is never an issue, for if the states are without the constitutional power to act 
vis-à-vis these things, then it matters not whether Congress has regulated.  
In short, the “division” of power that the written Constitution provides 
between federal and state power does not illuminate preemption analysis.  
Preemption issues do not arise where the Constitution allocates decision-
making authority exclusively to Congress and deprives states of regulatory 
power.  And in the circumstances where preemption is an issue, the Consti-
tution’s implicit allocation of concurrent authority (implicit insofar as it ex-
plicitly grants Congress power and does not remove similar power from the 
states) means that the Constitution does not answer whether state law has 
been preempted.  Rather, whether federal law that falls within Congress’s 
constitutional powers should displace state law is best understood as a pol-
icy question, not a justiciable constitutional question.  This would seem to 
be the essential teaching of modern Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
which wisely eschews invitations for courts to identify a category of matters 
that fall within an enumerated congressional power but nonetheless are be-
yond Congress’s powers.60 
On the other hand, one could argue that the Court’s Tenth Amendment 
analysis supports Merrill’s contention that questions of preemption impli-
cate constitutional considerations after all.  On this view, Congress’s deci-
sion whether state law should be preempted reflects Congress’s 
constitutional judgment concerning the relationship between state and fed-
eral power, but Congress’s judgment is not to be judicially reviewed.  This 
                                                                                                                           
Merrill himself “confess[es] to some ambivalence” about this variable because of the “difficulty of iden-
tifying the baseline against which one is to make a judgment about whether the division of power re-
quires rebalancing.”  Id. at 750. 
57  Id. at 757.  
58  See Nelson, supra note 1, at 225–27. 
59  Limiting doctrines include the dormant commerce clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
and the right to travel.  See generally Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism, supra note 29. 
60  See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985).  
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would mean that Merrill is correct to say that preemption decisions incorpo-
rate a constitutional component, but that he is mistaken as to the institu-
tional implications: this constitutional decision is properly made by 
Congress, not courts.  There is nothing novel, and certainly nothing inter-
nally inconsistent, about suggesting that a nonjudicial actor has the power 
to make a constitutional determination that is not subject to judicial re-
view.61  Moreover, there is (it seems to me) a real difference between saying 
that something is purely a policy decision to be made by Congress and say-
ing that something is a constitutional decision to be made by Congress that 
is largely unreviewable by courts.  One would hope that Congress would 
rise to the occasion when it realizes that it must make a constitutional deci-
sion—and sometimes Congress indeed has done so62—though Congress 
also could fail to do so, with the result that its constitutional determination 
would not be much if any different from a mere policy decision.63 
On balance, though, the decision whether state law should be pre-
empted is better characterized as a matter of policy judgment than as a con-
stitutional decision.  Persuasive at the end of the day is the fact that the 
written Constitution delegates lawmaking to Congress that largely overlaps 
with state lawmaking power, simultaneously granting power to Congress 
and withdrawing state regulatory power in only a handful of instances.  It 
perhaps is only at the aggregate level—taking account of all the circum-
stances where state law has been preempted and assessing the practical re-
siduum of state regulatory power that remains—where one properly can say 
that a constitutional question (likely the Tenth Amendment) is raised.  And 
even as to these matters, it is a difficult question whether they would be es-
sentially nonjusticiable like the rest of today’s Tenth Amendment doctrine 
or, akin to the exceptional anticommandeering doctrine, would be part of 
the narrow band of Tenth Amendment questions that falls to the courts. 
 
61  The constitutional provisions that fall under the political question doctrine all share this character-
istic.  See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (holding that the Senate, not courts, 
determines what is required by the instruction in Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 that the Senate shall “try” 
all impeachments). 
62  The Senate’s resolution of the recent filibuster controversy arguably so qualifies.  For a descrip-
tion of the conflict and its resolution by the “Gang of 14,” see Ryan T. Becker, Comment, The Other 
Nuclear Option: Adopting a Constitutional Amendment to Furnish a Lasting Solution to the Troubled 
Judicial Confirmation Process, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 981, 988–89 (2007). 
63  A difficult question is what criteria and sort of reasoning Congress appropriately deploys when 
making a constitutional determination.  There is no reason to think that a governmental institution so 
different from the courts necessarily would use the same criteria and reasoning as a court when it formu-
lates a constitutional judgment, especially where (as here) the constitutional text does not directly (or 
even implicitly) answer the question.  For a preliminary discussion of this, see Mark D. Rosen, Why the 
Defense of Marriage Act is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many 
Societal Actors that Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 932 & n.57 
(2006); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 
(2001).  I shall not say anything more about this set of difficult questions in this Article. 
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3. Schapiro’s and Merrill’s Important Common Ground.—When all 
is said and done, Schapiro’s and Merrill’s proposed substantive criteria 
share one essential characteristic that sharply diverges from contemporary 
preemption doctrine: both scholars’ approaches are firmly multilateralist.  
Both share the view that courts properly should take account of far more 
than statutory language when undertaking preemption analysis, specifically 
advising courts to consider the costs of displacing state law vis-à-vis the 
values of state sovereignty and federalism: Schapiro advises courts to take 
account of the costs of rejecting “polyphony” (the costs include the loss of 
“plurality, dialogue, and redundancy”), and Merrill advises courts that as-
sessing the tolerable degree of tension between state and federal law entails 
not just analysis of the federal law but also consideration of the tradeoffs 
between uniformity and diversity. 
In short, though I have some quibbles with Schapiro and Merrill that I 
have enumerated above, in the main I applaud their efforts to expand the 
range of considerations for courts to take into account in rendering their 
preemption determinations.  These scholars’ contributions (and, it is hoped, 
my refinements) provide a fuller understanding of what is at stake when 
state law is preempted, casting grave doubts on the advisability of current 
preemption doctrine’s unilateralist cant. 
The only possible bases for defending our current unilateralist preemp-
tion doctrine are lack of judicial institutional competence, lack of institu-
tional legitimacy, or both.  I take up each of these considerations below, 
ultimately concluding that neither provides a sufficiently strong reason for 
rejecting a multilateralist judicial doctrine of preemption. 
B. Institutional Considerations: Competency 
Both building on and (at points) critiquing Schapiro’s and Merrill’s 
contributions, this Subpart argues that although Congress ideally is the most 
suitable institution for deciding when and what state law should be pre-
empted, federal courts presently are the best positioned institution for mak-
ing preemption decisions.  Furthermore—and fortunately—if courts 
undertake a candid multilateralist analysis, which is best suited to generat-
ing intelligent preemption decisions, the resulting jurisprudence likely will 
enable Congress to assume greater responsibility in the near future for de-
ciding when and what state law is to be preempted. 
1. Congress and the Ideal World.—Schapiro’s theory is not primarily 
directed to the courts.  In his view, “preemption arguments should be di-
rected in the first instance to nonjudicial actors,”64 though he acknowledges 
that “[c]ourts will inevitably confront the question whether federal law pre-
empts particular state regulations.”65  Although Schapiro does not explicitly 
 
64  Schapiro, supra note 7, at 812. 
65  Id. 
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defend these two propositions in the course of his Symposium contribution, 
I agree with both, though I allocate responsibility among the branches a bit 
differently, as I discuss below.   
Schapiro’s first point that preemption decisions are best made, all 
things being equal, by Congress is correct.  As discussed above in defend-
ing multilateralism over unilateralism, preemption decisions are best made 
when they take account of a multitude of considerations.  These relevant 
factors are incommensurable; it is not possible to translate concurrency’s 
various costs and benefits into a common metric that permits a discretion-
free, logical answer to whether state law should be preempted.66  Instead, 
whether federal law should preempt state law is, at the end of the day, a 
deeply subjective, discretion-laden decision that simultaneously reflects and 
shapes the character of our country’s federal union.  For these reasons, 
whether state law should be preempted is best characterized as a subjective 
“political” decision that is most appropriately made by Congress, the most 
politically representative branch.67  
Congress is better situated than courts to make the political decisions 
that underwrite preemption for several reasons.  In terms of institutional 
competence, the most representative branch is better positioned than courts 
to assess public opinion (an important, if not the most important, driver be-
hind such decisions68) and to find facts.69  Moreover, Congress, unlike the 
courts, is expected to reflect public opinion.  These considerations explain 
why Congress both is more competent and is the more legitimate institution 
to decide what state law is appropriately preempted. 
Finally, preemption decisions are legitimately made by federal institu-
tions, rather than by state institutions, on account of the Supremacy Clause, 
which provides that federal law—as created by federal institutions70—
trumps state law.  This political architecture is wise because federal entities 
are more institutionally competent at making preemption decisions; state in-
terests are represented because federal representatives and senators are 
 
66  For a discussion of incommensurability, see Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign 
Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 820–23 (2004). 
67  Although the President also is representative insofar as he is elected by the people (more or less), 
the administrative agencies, which determine what state law is to be displaced when Congress does not, 
are not. 
68  Public opinion is not the sole determinant because politicians appropriately take account of their 
understanding of the “public interest,” a factor that may not always track contemporary public senti-
ment. 
69  Congress has ready contact with the public and the power to hold hearings.  Administrative agen-
cies do not directly assess public opinion, but also have significant factfinding powers, as Thomas 
Merrill notes.  See Merrill, supra note 2, at 755. 
70  This is generally, but not universally true, insofar as state courts sometimes create federal com-
mon law.  See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 825 (2005). 
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elected by states, and collective action problems would arise were preemp-
tion decisions left to the states.71   
2. Congress: Current Realities.—I also agree with Schapiro’s second 
point that courts nonetheless are likely to continue playing an important role 
in determining what state law is preempted.72  In a crucial passage in his 
contribution to this Symposium, Thomas Merrill provides a cogent argu-
ment for why it is “impossible . . . for Congress to play any kind of exclu-
sive or even dominant role in determining whether to displace state law.”73  
Merrill argues:  
The problem is not that Congress is institutionally incapable of spelling out 
whether displacement should or should not occur.  The problem, rather, is that 
Congress cannot anticipate in advance all the situations in which questions of 
displacement will arise.  Legislation operates ex ante, before particular dis-
putes about implementation and enforcement emerge. . . .  [S]ince displace-
ment involves assessing the degree of tension between federal and state law, 
Congress would have to analyze and interpret the common law and statutory 
rules of fifty states and thousands of municipalities.  This would include not 
only those statutes and ordinances in existence at the time it legislated, but also 
all those that might be enacted in the future.  This is beyond impossible.74 
Merrill’s points here strike me as largely correct, though overstated.  
Preemption doctrine’s task of deciding how conflict between federal and 
state law is to be sorted out invariably requires much ex ante analysis for 
the reasons Merrill identifies.  On the other hand, patterns likely will arise 
over time in the case law.  These patterns can then put “conscientious legis-
lators”75 on notice as to the sorts of decisions they should make when enact-
ing a statute, consistent with the well-known common law pattern in which 
courts take the first crack at solving problems—and in the process provide 
experience and legal rules that can serve as the starting point for legislative 
solutions. 
For example, past litigation teaches that federal statutes that impose li-
censing requirements for marketing goods that are subject to state product 
liability law invariably raise the question whether the federal standard pro-
 
71  For more on this point, see Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Per-
spective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, at 591–602 (2008). 
72  See Schapiro, supra note 7, at 812. 
73  Merrill, supra note 2, at 754.  Upon concluding that Congress can play only a limited role in ren-
dering preemption decisions, Merrill proceeds to analyze “[t]he two most obvious candidates for under-
taking such ex post inquiries,” namely “courts and the agencies charged with administration of federal 
statutes.”  Id.  
74  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
75  Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 585 (1975) (arguing that legislators should learn how to interpret both the Constitution and opin-
ions of courts interpreting the Constitution).  
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vides the floor or ceiling for product safety.  And even if the federal stan-
dard is to be the ceiling, can state law nevertheless compensate for injuries 
via strict liability?76  It would not be an “impossible” task for Congress to 
answer these sorts of questions.  Indeed, answering these questions argua-
bly does not require analysis of even a single state’s law, much less all fifty 
states’ laws.  There is no good reason why Congress could not answer this 
readily anticipated question when it enacts statutes that provide standards of 
care for activities that already are the subject of state regulations. 
Other recurring preemption questions that arise when Congress legis-
lates may require consideration of the substantive state laws, but even there 
the task facing Congress may be less daunting than Merrill suggests.  To 
begin, for some of the recurring issues, determining whether state law 
should be preempted may not turn on the particulars of a state’s law.  Con-
sistent with this, a determination by the Supreme Court that ERISA pre-
empts Michigan tort and contract law is not understood by the Court or the 
larger community of lawyers to mean that only Michigan tort and contract 
law has been preempted and that, for instance, Illinois tort and contract law 
has not.77 
Finally, even if preemption sometimes may appropriately turn on the 
particulars of a state’s law, this generally would not require Congress to 
analyze the proposed federal law’s relation to fifty different laws.  Though 
our country has fifty states with different tort laws, we do not have fifty 
unique tort regimes.  Instead, differences among state law tend to fall into 
patterns,78 which is one of the reasons why law schools teach traditional 
state law subjects from national casebooks.  Those recurring preemption 
questions that are sensitive to the particulars of state law accordingly may 
require congressional analysis of three or four types of state law rather than 
fifty states’ laws—a difficult task to be sure, but something that falls short 
of “beyond impossible.”79 
In short, to the extent that Merrill’s analysis suggests that Congress is 
institutionally incapable of making preemption decisions, it seems to be too 
pessimistic an assessment.  Nonetheless, it does seem likely that Congress 
 
76  For more on this issue, see Catherine Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 841 (2008). 
77  See Metro. Life Insur. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62–64 (1987). 
78  See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 583 (1996) 
(“[In the nationwide class action context,] there will never be fifty different substantive rules, or even 
fifteen or ten.  States tend to copy their laws from each other, and many use identical or virtually identi-
cal rules.  In practice, the court will seldom have to deal with more than three of four formula-
tions . . . .”). 
79  Merrill, supra note 2, at 754.  Finally, although Merrill is surely correct that Congress cannot be 
expected to consider preemption in relation to state law that might be enacted in the future, true legisla-
tive innovations are a rarity.  Most federal legislation that raises potential preemption questions (much 
legislation does not, such as military authorizations and tax) extends or alters the baseline tort or con-
tract rules.  This increases the likelihood that Congress will be able to anticipate the sorts of preemption 
issues that the legislation will raise, subject to the caveats raised above in text. 
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is not presently capable of serving that role with respect to many if not most 
preemption issues.  This likely is due to the doctrines developed by the 
courts to date; the unilateralist preemption doctrine’s sole express focus on 
(frequently nonexistent) statutory intent has hidden the substantive consid-
erations that properly (and probably do sub rosa) inform preemption analy-
sis.80  Such lack of doctrinal candor certainly has hindered courts’ common 
law refinement of the considerations that thereafter could serve as Con-
gress’s starting materials.  
3. Three Alternatives to Congress.—Present congressional incapacity 
does not on its own indicate which institution should make preemption de-
cisions.  There are two obvious candidates, and a third that should not es-
cape attention either.  The two most prominent contestants, to which 
Merrill’s contribution dedicates considerable time and sheds much light, are 
administrative agencies and courts.  The third possibility is that some alto-
gether new institution could be created.81 
a. Agencies.—Let us first consider the choice between agencies 
and courts.  Merrill notes that both agencies and courts have the crucial ad-
vantage vis-à-vis Congress that they can “address[] displacement controver-
sies ex post, after they have crystallized, in a way that Congress cannot.”82  
Merrill’s analysis here is helpful insofar as it reminds us of Congress’s pre-
sent incapacities.  But it is incomplete to the extent that it neglects to con-
sider how agencies stack up against courts vis-à-vis this factor of ex post 
decisionmaking. 
The answer turns on two factors.  The first is the nature of the agency 
action: for example, the difference between agencies and courts is almost 
nonexistent with regard to adjudications in Article I courts but is consider-
able vis-à-vis agency rulemaking.  Although agencies act in a less prospec-
tive manner than Congress insofar as they always have an opportunity to 
gather some data on how a statute operates in practice, agency actions vary 
in the degree to which they rely on ex ante decisionmaking.  Further, the 
extent to which agency rulemaking in effect relies on ex ante decisionmak-
ing turns on precisely when the agency promulgates rules.  If it waits a con-
siderable period of time after the statute’s enactment so that it has time to 
amass some data—and if the statutory scheme can effectively operate in 
this interim period absent agency regulations—then agency rulemaking can 
be ex post.  If these conditions are not present, however, the agency will 
 
80  Merrill makes the same point.  See id. at 741–42. 
81  Roderick Hills cogently made this point in his oral presentation at the Symposium.  Hills, Com-
ments, supra note 8. 
82  Merrill, supra note 2, at 755.  Though the language quoted above appears in Merrill’s discussion 
of administrative agencies, immediately before that Merrill writes that “[t]he two most obvious candi-
dates for undertaking such ex post inquiries are courts and the agencies charged with administration of 
federal statutes.”  Id. at 754. 
102:781  (2008) Contextualizing Preemption 
 801 
have to hypothesize in the same manner as Congress.  The second factor 
relevant to comparing court and agency competencies vis-à-vis ex post de-
cisionmaking is the degree to which intelligent preemption decisions need 
be context-specific.  To the extent they must be, the above-mentioned dif-
ference between nonadjudicatory agency action and court decisions be-
comes increasingly significant.83 
In short, the extent of agencies’ advantages vis-à-vis Congress with re-
gard to ex post decisionmaking turns on a host of assumptions and factual 
contingencies.  Federal courts, by contrast, virtually always engage in pure 
ex post decisionmaking that requires them to answer legal questions in rela-
tion to concrete facts and situations.  Courts, then, would appear to have an 
institutional advantage over agencies with respect to ex post reasoning, 
even if it is true that agencies in the aggregate have the institutional edge 
over Congress. 
Merrill also appears to be skeptical that courts should afford agency 
views Skidmore deference on the critical question of the degree of tension 
between federal and state law and whether this warrants displacement.84  I 
agree.  Those advocating Skidmore deference tend to stress that such defer-
ence is proper because agencies “draw[] upon the ‘specialized experience 
and broader investigations and information’” vis-à-vis courts.85  Though 
agencies admittedly have expertise regarding the impact of divergent state 
laws on the implementation of federal programs,86 the degree of allowable 
tension between federal and state law turns on far more than this federal-
focused inquiry.  As Merrill notes, determining the allowable tension is a 
function of “the pragmatic consequences of either uniformity or diversity in 
legal standards,”87 and this requires assessments of states’ interests and the 
benefits of federalism,88 matters in which agencies have no particular exper-
tise.  More than this, agencies may neglect to give adequate consideration to 
these state and federalism interests on account of their tunnel-vision federal 
focus on the statutes they are charged with implementing.  Finally, there is 
just cause to be suspicious of agency determinations regarding such matters, 
even when they ostensibly take account of states’ interests and federalism.  
After all, determining the tolerable level of tension between state and fed-
eral law in effect polices the boundaries between state and federal power, 
and there are good reasons to be skeptical of a bureaucracy’s decision re-
 
83  The need for high context-specificity seems to be directly proportional to the force of Merrill’s 
comments regarding congressional incapacity to engage in ex ante decisionmaking to render intelligent 
preemption decisions. 
84  Merrill, supra note 2, at 775–78.  
85  Id. at 770 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).  For a comprehensive examina-
tion of the Skidmore standard, see Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007). 
86  Merrill, supra note 2, at 755. 
87  Id. at 752. 
88  See id. at 752–53. 
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garding its own powers.89  For these reasons, it seems unwise to give agency 
determinations regarding the proper level of tension between federal and 
state law the significant deference that Skidmore is generally understood to 
require.90  This objection does not carry over, however, to agency findings 
regarding the ways in which state law may frustrate federal objectives, and 
Skidmore deference may well be appropriate for those agency determina-
tions. 
b. Courts.—Having identified present congressional incapacity 
and agency deficiencies with regard to preemption decisions, it does not 
ineluctably follow that preemption should be left to the courts.  The ques-
tion is whether courts are institutionally capable of rendering intelligent 
preemption decisions.  The types of incommensurable considerations that 
appropriately inform preemption analysis challenge courts’ institutional 
competence for the reasons adduced above—reasons that support Congress 
as the best institution to make such decisions.91  On the other hand, many 
legal doctrines ask courts to undertake such “weighings” of incommensur-
ables (consider balancing tests, for instance92).  The real question is not 
whether courts are perfectly suited to deciding among incommensurables—
they clearly are not—but whether decisionmaking on preemption questions 
is best undertaken with the participation of courts and, if so, whether judi-
cial decisionmaking is better under a simplified unilateralist approach or a 
complex, incommensurable-infused multilateralist approach.93  The norma-
tively relevant considerations that are omitted under a unilateralist approach 
to preemption strongly suggest the latter.  Further, the arguments presented 
above for suspecting agency judgments counsel in favor of a judicial role 
because federal courts are more disinterested than agencies in policing the 
 
89  While it is true that federal courts also are part of the federal government, courts in all likelihood 
are less self-interested than agencies in determining the scope of the federal agency’s powers.  On the 
other hand, it is possible that federal courts are not sufficiently mindful of state interests and that it 
would be preferable to craft a new institution that, in accordance with Roderick Hills’s suggestion at the 
Symposium, see Hills, Comments, supra note 8, would ensure that state interests are properly accounted 
for.  See infra Part II.B.3.c. 
90  For an empirical examination that shows the significant deference that courts tend to grant agency 
decisions under Skidmore deference, see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 85, at 1250–91.  
91  Cf. Merrill, supra note 2, at 753–54 (discussing Congress’s institutionally appropriate role of de-
ciding subjective policy questions). 
92  More than this, constitutional law pervasively requires courts to decide among incommensurables 
whenever two or more constitutional principles conflict, a phenomenon that frequently occurs.  See 
Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown, supra note 36, at 1737 & n.120.  Richard Fallon has suggested other in-
teresting respects in which incommensurability difficulties permeate constitutional law.  Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 
1191–92 (1987). 
93  Cf. NEIL H. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994) (persuasively arguing that although it frequently is the case 
that no institution is perfectly suited to rendering a particular decision, decisionmaking should be allo-
cated to the institution best suited to undertaking the analysis that properly informs the decision). 
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borders between state law and the federal law that an agency is charged 
with implementing.94  Also weighing in favor of a multilateralist judicial 
approach is that it promises to refine the various considerations, better pre-
paring Congress to make intelligent preemption decisions some time in the 
future. 
Once again, examples from other fields in which multiple governmen-
tal institutions have overlapping authority can be helpful.  Consider the ex-
perience from the choice-of-laws doctrines that govern interstate conflicts.  
Determining which state is to have jurisdiction to grant and modify child 
custody orders in situations where one or more of the parents have exited 
the state where the predivorce family resided can be daunting as a matter of 
ex ante reasoning.  Over time, however, courts heard and resolved cases 
that raised this question and, in the process, were able to identify a set of 
considerations that were generally agreed to be normatively relevant to re-
solving this conundrum.  Courts’ real-world experiences, as mediated by 
scholars, provided a template to legislatures, which then crafted a statutory 
solution that, though imperfect, has made matters far more manageable than 
before.95 
I do not mean to overstate things.  Novel federal legislation inevitably 
will interact with state laws in unanticipatable ways.  For questions that 
Congress is institutionally incapable of presently legislating on an ex ante 
basis, delegating decisionmaking power to an institution whose ex post op-
eration makes it more suited to the task of resolving preemption questions 
seems perfectly appropriate.  My point, though, is that many Merrillean ten-
sions between federal and state law are readily foreseen—or could be, if 
scholars devoted their attention to identifying them, as they did in the 
choice-of-laws context.  These hard decisions ought to be made by Con-
gress, for the reasons discussed above, after the courts have made their first 
cut and positioned Congress to do a reasonable job.   
c. Other institutions.—The final question is whether preemption 
determinations would best be made by some new institution.  Roderick 
Hills, for example, has suggested creating a statutory scheme that in effect 
establishes a framework in which federal agencies and states can directly 
 
94  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
95  This is a thumbnail sketch of the history, from common law solution to the issue of child custody, 
to drafting and state-by-state enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (the UCCJA), to 
the drafting and state-by-state enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act (the UCCJEA).  See generally EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON 
C. CYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 658–65 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing common law and the first uni-
form act, the UCCJA); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 356–58 (5th 
ed. 2006) (noting that “[t]he UCCJA has done much to end the tragedy of snatch-and-run relitigation of 
custody decrees that was all too common in pre-Act cases” and discussing the new UCCJEA).  Scholars 
correctly note the deficiencies of the pre-uniform Act common law rules in relation to child custody, but 
they do not give fair credit to the role that the common law cases played in putting the drafters of the 
uniform laws on notice as to what considerations ought to count for purposes of the statutes. 
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bargain and thereby determine how federal and state law is to interface.96  
Given the limitations of Congress, agencies, and courts canvassed above, it 
seems sensible to keep our minds open to potential new solutions.  This is 
not a pipe dream; the history of American public law is replete with institu-
tional innovations (such as the twentieth century’s rise of the administrative 
state).  I cannot hope to even sketch the plans for a new institution in this 
short Article, but I look forward to thinking more about this issue in the fu-
ture and to seeing what refinements Hills and others may offer us. 
C. Institutional Considerations: Legitimacy 
Having considered various governmental institutions’ capacities to un-
dertake the reasoning that preemption appropriately calls for, an important 
remaining question is whether these institutions legitimately have the power 
to render preemption decisions.  There is no question that congressional 
delegation of authority to an administrative agency to develop preemption 
rules would satisfy contemporary constitutional requirements.97  With re-
gard to federal courts, however, Professor Martin H. Redish argued at the 
Symposium that Congress alone has the authority under the Constitution to 
decide that state law is to be displaced.98  If Congress has not clearly indi-
cated that state law is to be displaced, Redish proposed, then state law 
stands. 
It seems to me that federal courts unquestionably have the constitu-
tional power to go beyond such a limited role.  There are two plausible 
ways in which the judicial power to actively participate in preemption can 
be conceptualized.  First, courts’ role vis-à-vis preemption can be under-
stood as an aspect of ordinary statutory interpretation.  Although court rul-
ings construing express statutory preemption provisions are readily 
assimilated to the statutory interpretation paradigm, court decisions finding 
preemption in the absence of express statutory preemption language may 
also fall within the realm of statutory interpretation insofar as courts regu-
larly find “implied” provisions when undertaking purported statutory inter-
pretation.99  By and large, this is how courts speak of preemption today: as a 
form of ordinary statutory interpretation. 
Second—and more appealing for reasons I make clear below—the ju-
dicial role in preemption matters can be understood as falling within the 
power of federal courts to create federal common law that helps implement 
 
96  See Hills, Comments, supra note 8. 
97  For a discussion (and critique) of the current doctrine, see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, 
Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1042–44 (2007). 
98  See Redish, Comments, supra note 24.  
99  Matthew G. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the 
Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 105–06 (2005) (discussing the modern “view that 
judicial ‘implication’ of private rights of action should be viewed as an exercise in statutory construc-
tion”). 
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federal statutes.  Virtually all commentators agree that this sort of federal 
common law survives Erie v. Tompkins, is constitutionally legitimate, and 
is institutionally appropriate.100  The judicial power to make federal com-
mon law can be thought of as a delegation of lawmaking authority to courts 
given the inevitable gaps and interstices of federal statutory law.101  Preemp-
tion doctrine is naturally assimilated to federal common law because, as ar-
gued above, Congress is institutionally incapable at this point of directly 
answering most preemption questions, and courts’ ex post decisionmaking 
render them suited to the task.  Judicial preemption doctrines, on this view, 
serve to fill in the gaps as to what state law must be displaced to effectuate 
federal law.102  While the line between statutory interpretation and federal 
common law can be murky,103 most scholars continue to treat them dis-
tinctly,104 and for good reason.  Federal common law describes a realm of 
judicial lawmaking that is different from mere statutory interpretation in the 
following crucial way: the moniker federal common law refers to judicial 
lawmaking that is less constrained, and more discretionary, than is sug-
gested by “statutory interpretation,” whose paradigmatic methodology is 
 
100  See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, SOSA, Customary International 
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 879 (2007) (correctly noting that 
“[w]hile there is much scholarly debate about the proper contours of federal common law, there is wide-
spread agreement that federal common law must be grounded in a federal law source” such as a federal 
statute). 
101  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 40–46 (1985) (speaking of federal common law as being, inter alia, a form of “delegated law making” 
by courts). 
102  My account of the legitimacy of federal courts’ involvement in deciding the parameters of pre-
emption is consistent with the contemporary scholar who has advocated one of the narrowest approaches 
to preemption, Caleb Nelson.  Nelson has propounded an exceedingly interesting originalist argument 
that the Supremacy Clause authorizes the simple rule that “[c]ourts are required to disregard state law if, 
but only if, it contradicts a rule validly established by federal law.”  Nelson, supra note 1, at 260.  For 
example, Nelson suggests that a state law purporting to prohibit all union membership appropriately 
would be preempted by a valid federal law that gave workers the right to join a labor union.  Id. at 261.  
Nelson does not argue that federal courts are consequently without constitutional power to displace any 
additional state law, recognizing that some federal statutes “may establish (or authorize courts to estab-
lish) a subconstitutional rule of obstacle preemption.”  Id. at 304.  Though our approaches differ in im-
portant respects (I do not advocate the unilateralist doctrine of obstacle preemption but suggest that 
courts embrace a different, multilateralist approach), the important point for present purposes is Nel-
son’s recognition that federal statutes can authorize courts to develop preemption doctrines even if the 
Constitution itself does not. 
103  See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 
78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980). 
104  See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1245 (1996); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 585 (2006).  For one important exception, see Merrill, supra note 101, at 7 (advocating an ap-
proach to federal common law that absorbs much of what typically is spoken of as statutory interpreta-
tion). 
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text-based analysis.105  On this view, it is more accurate to describe our 
complex body of antitrust law as a form of federal common law: the laconic 
federal antitrust statutes in effect gave a license to federal courts to develop 
antitrust law, and in doing so courts primarily appealed to considerations 
extrinsic to the statutory language itself, such as straightforward policy and 
economic analysis.106 
In short, describing the judicial role on preemption questions as con-
sisting of no more than ordinary statutory interpretation more readily gives 
rise to a unilateralist doctrine than does saying that the courts are charged 
with creating federal common law that effectuates a statute.  At the end of 
the day, though, labels matter only so much; respected members of the legal 
community understand antitrust doctrine to have been created through the 
process of statutory interpretation notwithstanding textual exegesis’s rela-
tively small role,107 and I would be satisfied if courts engaged in similarly 
wide-ranging analysis in working out preemption’s details.  The bottom line 
is this: Schapiro’s and Merrill’s articles in effect make a strong case that 
preemption doctrine’s current unilateralism excludes too many normatively 
relevant criteria, leading to nontransparent, if not downright poor, deci-
sionmaking by courts.108  Courts’ decisionmaking instead should be in-
formed by a wide range of considerations, not just statutory language.  And 
federal courts have the power to do this under the judicial power to make 
federal common law and interpret statutes. 
D. Two Modest Institutional Reforms 
For reasons explained above, I heartily agree with Merrill’s and 
Schapiro’s conclusions that courts are likely to continue playing a signifi-
cant role in determining what state law is preempted (though I think it likely 
that Congress’s role will increase after the courts refine the relevant criteria 
over time).109  Merrill correctly notes that one of courts’ institutional defi-
ciencies in relation to Congress and administrative agencies is with respect 
 
105  Cf. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
180–82 (2001) (discussing the notion of “paradigm cases,” that is, the “central or most clearly estab-
lished instances” of a rule or concept). 
106  For a similar suggestion, see Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in This 
Class?” The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619 (2005); 
Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 104, at 590 & n.26; Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in 
an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 934 (2004). 
107  See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 317, 320 (2005) (describing the Court’s decisions that baseball is not covered by the antitrust laws 
as an example of statutory interpretation rather than federal common law); Lawrence M. Solan, Statu-
tory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209 (2003) (treating antitrust law as 
an example of statutory interpretation). 
108  See Merrill, supra note 2, at 741–44; Schapiro, supra note 7, at 824–29. 
109  See supra text accompanying notes 72–79. 
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to what he dubs the “representation” variable,110 that is, “having the interests 
of all affected parties represented in the process that determines the vertical 
division of power between the federal government and the states.”111  The 
problem is that courts may make preemption determinations based only on 
the argumentation of the litigating parties, thereby rendering important de-
cisions about the scope of state regulatory authority without input from the 
states or other interested parties (such as consumers).  Making matters 
worse, although “states and other affected parties can and do file amicus cu-
riae briefs in major preemption cases. . . .[,] courts are not required to re-
spond to these briefs or even to read them.”112 
The omission of interested parties—particularly the states—from 
courts’ decisionmaking processes is deeply problematic under a multilater-
alist approach that recognizes that factors apart from federal interests ap-
propriately inform preemption.  Fortunately, relatively modest institutional 
innovations can go a long way toward remedying courts’ institutional defi-
ciencies in these respects.  One reason why states frequently do not file 
amicus briefs is that they frequently do not know that a preemption question 
is being litigated in court.113  The first step in involving states is to make 
certain that they know that a preemption decision is in the offing.  For ex-
ample, a federal statute could mandate that notice be given to states when a 
preemption question is under consideration, akin to the Class Action Fair-
ness Act’s requirement that states be notified of proposed settlement 
agreements in class action lawsuits.114  Any such notice likely should extend 
beyond the state whose law is potentially being preempted in the lawsuit to 
include all states because a Michigan federal court decision holding that 
Michigan tort law is preempted by a federal statute virtually always is taken 
to hold that state tort law is preempted, not just Michigan’s tort law.115  Fur-
thermore, since preemption issues sometimes arise in state courts, it would 
be sensible for the federal statute to make clear that its notice requirements 
apply to preemption questions that arise in state courts as well.  This would 
require some serious study that is beyond the scope of this short Article, 
however, because federal regulation of state procedures in this context may 
raise tricky constitutional questions.116 
 
110  Merrill, supra note 2, at 758. 
111  Id. at 749. 
112  Id. at 758 (footnote omitted).  
113  Solicitor generals from several states have made this point to the author. 
114  See 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2000).  
115  Although a district court’s ruling does not have precedential value beyond the judicial district, its 
persuasive effect probably justifies broader notice that would allow any interested state to participate. 
116  Congress would have constitutional authority pursuant to the Sweeping Clause to ensure that 
preemption decisions effectuating constitutional federal questions were appropriately made, and current 
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence would not appear to pose any bar to a federal statute that imposed the 
modest requirements discussed in the text.  Nevertheless, federal regulations of state procedure poten-
tially raise complex constitutional questions that merit sustained analysis that goes beyond the scope of 
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There may be entities apart from states—for example, industry and 
consumer groups—that also have an interest in preemption decisions.  The 
considerations that counsel in favor of multilateralist preemption doctrine 
also counsel in favor of giving these nonstate actors notice when preemp-
tion decisions are being made.  It would be more difficult to provide effec-
tive notice to these more diffuse entities than to states, all of which have 
attorneys general with publicly listed addresses.  Nonetheless, one can de-
rive helpful guidance from the class action context, where courts for years 
have been pressed to devise methods for giving notice to class members 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) class actions.  I do not take 
a firm position here, however, on whether notice to nonstate entities ulti-
mately would be worth the time and costs involved; I simply wish to put the 
issue on the table. 
The problem identified by Merrill that federal courts need not respond 
to or even read states’ amicus briefs can be alleviated by a statute that gives 
states or their agents (such as the National Conference of State Legislatures) 
an unconditional right to intervene for the sole purpose of litigating any 
preemption questions that have been raised in a case.117  Although such an 
automatic right to intervene would increase litigation costs, any such addi-
tional costs would be justified by the very considerations that counsel in fa-
vor of multilateralist doctrine: if contemporary preemption doctrine 
shortchanges the interests of stakeholders apart from the federal govern-
ment, it would be a mistake to shift to multilateralist analysis and yet to 
continue with a litigation process that does not allow participation of all the 
affected stakeholders or, at the very least, the most important stakeholders 
(that is, states). 
It is arguable that there already is statutory authority mandating state 
notification in cases where state law may be preempted under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2403(b).118  That provision requires notification to the attorney general in 
any action in federal court “wherein the constitutionality of any statute of 
that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question.”119  However, 
this provision is not generally understood to require notification when pre-
emption questions arise, and there are no reported decisions in which a pre-
                                                                                                                           
this Article.  For an illuminating discussion of similar issues, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regula-
tion of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001) (analyzing federal regulations of state proce-
dures in relation to state-created rights).  Although it is well accepted that “Congress has limited 
authority to prescribe procedural rules that state courts must follow in enforcing federal rights of action,” 
id. at 959, preemption presents a different, more difficult question: does Congress have the power to 
regulate state judicial procedures for deciding the question whether a state law claim survives potential 
preemption by federal law?  Some federal legislation has mandated certain procedures (such as prelitiga-
tion notice requirements) for purely state law claims brought in state court, see id. at 954 (discussing the 
Y2K Act), but “individual Senators and the Department of Justice questioned its constitutionality” and 
no courts have ruled on these provisions’ constitutionality.  Id. 
117  See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
118  See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (2006); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(c). 
119  28 U.S.C. § 2403(b). 
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emption question has triggered § 2403(b)’s language of “constitutionality.”  
This is not surprising; one can readily see how preemption doctrine as it is 
currently understood—as merely a matter of statutory interpretation—does 
not warrant notification under § 2403(b).  Accordingly, ensuring that states 
have the right to intervene probably would require additional action on the 
part of Congress. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Presently, courts undertake preemption doctrine by means of a unilat-
eralist approach that excludes too many normatively relevant considera-
tions.  Schapiro’s and Merrill’s Symposium contributions identify many of 
the factors that contemporary preemption doctrine should explicitly incor-
porate.  The effort to revamp the doctrine is aided by consulting other con-
texts where the powers of multiple governmental entities overlap.  These 
other contexts can help illuminate generic benefits and costs of concur-
rency, and may be relevant in yet other ways to preemption doctrine’s re-
construction.   
Although Congress is better suited institutionally to balancing the inc-
ommensurable competing considerations that a sound multilateralist doc-
trine recognizes, Congress is not well suited to making the large number of 
ex ante decisions that comprehensive preemption provisions must include.  
This may change over time, however, if courts adopt the multilateralist doc-
trine advocated here that requires them to candidly consider the multiplicity 
of relevant considerations that appropriately inform preemption decisions.  
Such judicial activity in all likelihood would refine our collective under-
standing of the various considerations, and common law patterns likely 
would emerge as well.  All of this could then serve as crucial data points 
and input for Congress.  In the interim period during which courts continue 
to play an important role in developing preemption doctrine, Congress 
should take steps to ensure that states have notice of lawsuits that raise pre-
emption questions and have the opportunity to intervene.  Finally, it is 
worth considering whether it would be wise to craft some novel institutional 
alternative that can render preemption decisions. 
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